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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP  
INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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COUNTRY Argentina/USSR

DATE:

SUBJECT Observations on USSR-Argentine Relations by  
Soviet Ambassador Sergueev

DIST. 19 Sept. 1947

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1. Soviet Ambassador Miguel Sergueev has recently explained Soviet policy in Argentina as follows:
  - a. At the end of the War the Soviet Government realized the importance of Argentina in the Western Hemisphere and the possibility of exploiting Argentine animosity towards the United States.
  - b. The Soviet Government saw that it could not hope to effect a political rapprochement with Argentina but believed that it could help Argentina economically, thus making Argentina less dependent on the U.S. and Great Britain. Once Argentina was linked more closely with the Soviet economically, Argentina could then assert her political and economic independence and adopt a more or less neutral attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet-U.S. impasse.
  - c. Ambassador Sergueev was instructed by Moscow to inform President Peron that the Soviet was disposed to aid Argentina economically, even at a great sacrifice to the Soviet Union, in return for Argentine "neutrality" in the ideological conflict between the U.S. and Russia.
2. The former Chief of the Soviet Commercial Mission in Buenos Aires, Constantin Shevelev, first approached President Peron on the matter. Sergueev later had a lengthy interview with the Argentine chief executive, in which Peron told Sergueev that Argentina could maintain her economic independence only if she were furnished heavy machinery, steel, and other essential materials. Sergueev agreed to consult Moscow on the extent to which the Soviet could supply the necessary equipment for Argentina's industrialization plans.
3. The Soviet Embassy later learned that Sergueev's proposal to Peron ran into much opposition from Miguel Miranda (Argentine economic czar at the time) and his group in the government, all of whom were urging Peron to cast his lot one hundred per cent with the U.S. Moscow's approval of the proposal to aid Argentina economically arrived too late. Miranda had already succeeded in orienting Argentina's economy towards the U.S.
4. Ambassador Sergueev, however, has reportedly received a promise from President Peron that Argentina will not form part of any block of countries that is organized to directly oppose Soviet policy. Sergueev is not certain whether or not Peron is sincere. He suspects that Peron may be playing the U.S. against Russia and vice versa, or that he possibly was a victim of Miranda's political and economic machinations.

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5. Sergueev now feels that the Soviet plan to build up an economically independent Argentina in the Western Hemisphere, which in turn would exert great influence on her neighboring countries, has failed. However, he regards this failure as "loss of the first battle and not of the war."
6. Sergueev believes that President Peron's political position is becoming increasingly difficult. He says that with the close of the Rio Conference, Peron is confronted with the quandary of either linking Argentina closer to the U.S.; thereby antagonizing the Argentine Nationalists; or with reincorporating Nationalist representation into his government, a move which Sergueev thinks would damage U.S.-Argentine relations. Sergueev sees a great opportunity for the Soviets if Peron is forced to appease the Nationalists.
7. Sergueev is also optimistic over the possibility that Peron will be overthrown. In such an event, he believes an anti-United States government would take over, and that individuals such as Miranda and the others who have oriented Argentina towards the U.S. will be in disfavor. He is also confident that Communist infiltration of Argentine labor will be a great help to the Soviet in the event of an Argentine political upheaval.
8. In regard to Communist infiltration of Argentine labor, Eusebio Dworkin, First Secretary of the Polish Legation, who is in close touch with the Soviet Embassy, has recently stated that the Argentine Communist Party (CPA) has been remarkably successful in infiltrating Peronista labor ranks. Dworkin believes that the Peron government is cognizant of this infiltration, and that the CPA realizes that Peron is apt to provoke labor disturbances at any time with the express purpose of blaming the CPA.
9. Dworkin has learned from his CPA contacts that the Party fears that if Peron's political position deteriorates further, he will organize a mass labor demonstration calling for support. In such a demonstration, riots and fights would be provoked by Peronistas, and the ensuing trouble would all be blamed on the CPA. The Party believes that Peron would then launch a Communist persecution campaign. Aware of this danger, the CPA is doing its best to conceal the identity of more important Party members already infiltrated into labor organizations, and will let some of its less important members be sacrificed if an emergency arises.

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